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BILLBOARD REGULATION IN OHIO
This article is an analysis of the legal principles applicable to the
regulation of billboards other than by zoning ordinance.
An increasing interest in the regulation of billboards is indicated
by a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision' and by two bills introduced
during the last session of the Ohio General Assembly.2
The problem of regulating billboards is not new in Ohio or else-
where. As early as 1902 the state granted to municipalities specific power
to regulate them.3  Essentially the same statute exists today.4 Local
zoning ordinances were enacted pursuant to this grant of authority.
They were challenged as being an unreasonable interference with private
property.' The history of that legal struggle and the gradual development
of the standards required for that type of regulation is amply recorded'
so that reference to it will be made only where applicable to the present
discussion. It will suffice here to observe that several larger cities today
have comprehensive zoning ordinances which provide some measure of
control of -billboards within the municipality.
7
Present interest appears to center upon regulation along state high-
ways. The two principal means of control considered here are the
state police power and the application of the power of eminent domain.
- BILLBOARDS As PROPERTY
To discuss the use of either the police power or the power of eminent
domain it is necessary to determine the essential nature of any "right"
to erect billboards.
It is implicit in the language of the courts of Ohio in the cases
challenging the validity of municipal ordinances regulating billboards
that they consider the right to erect them to be a property right.' Such
1 Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E. 2d 719 (1954).
2 S.B. 55, introduced January 17, 1955; identical bill, H.B. 349, introduced
February 2, 1955. Neither of these bills passed.
3 96 OHio LAWS 23 (1902). This statute gave municipalities power "To regu-
late the erection of . . . fences, billboards, signs, and other structures within the
corporate limits ..... "
4 Onio REv. CODE §715.27 is substantially the same as 96 OHio LAWS 23 (1902).
5 For example, see ordinance set out in State ex. rel. Morton v. Rapp, 16 Ohio
N. P. (n.s.) 1, 99 Ohio Dec. 596 (1914).
6 See for example, Ruth F. Wilson, Billboards and the Right to Be Seen
From the Highway, 30 GEORGETOWN L.J. 723 (1941-42); Henry W. Proffitt, Public
Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 151 (1931); J. Lester Mee, Validity
of Muncipal Regulation of Outdoor Advertising, 4 JOHN MARSHALL L.Q. 323
(1939).
7 Building and Zoning Code of Cincinnati 488, c. 17 (1952) ; Codified Ordi-
nances of Cleveland, §§5.1110(8), (9), 5.1112(2) (K) (1951) ; General Ordinances
of Dayton Vol. 1 §§211(10)(e), (f), (g), 225(e) (1954).
8 State ex rel. Morton v. Hauser, 17 Ohio App. 4 (1922); State ex reL.
Morton v. Rapp, note 5, supra; Cusack v. Cincinnati, 9 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 466
(1910). In State ex rel. Morton v. Hauser, the court said "We do not find that these
COMMENTS
a concept is not consonant with the older, more narrow view that "prop-
erty" consists of so much physical land or physical assets. The modern
and more elastic concept of property embraces within the term not only
the physical res but the legal rights and privileges resultant from owner-
ship. Nichols, in his work on eminent domain states:
The word "property", as used in the constitutional pro-
visions that property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation is treated as a word of most general import
and is liberally construed . .. it has been used to indicate the
aggregate rights which an owner possesses in or with respect to
such corporeal object.'
The Ohio Supreme Court in Smith v. Erie Rd. Co.,' ° although
denying that there had been a taking of any property by the delay of a
railroad in completing a grade crossing elimination stated:
... The broader view, which now obtains generally, conceives
property to be the interest of the owner in the thing owned
... Under this broad construction there need not be a physical
taking of the property or even dispossession, any substantial
interference with the elemental rights growing out of owner-
ship of private property is considered a taking.
In Ohio the broad interpretation prevails and compensation
has been allowed for loss of riparian rights, for the impairment
of the abutting owner's right in the street, which is in the nature
of an incorporeal hereditament, for the casting of extraneous
and annoying substances on the owner's land and in many other
instances; . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Crawford v. Delaware,'" the city changed a street grade. It
took none of the plaintiff's land but impaired his access to the street.
The supreme court allowed recovery saying:
We hold that when the avenue to the place of business of
the lot-owner, and his use of the street as an incident to his
permanent erections, is thus blocked up or taken from him,
after the establishment, and by alteration of a grade, the private
rights of the owner, inherent in and incident to the erections
upon the lot, are invaded ...
It is as positive and substantial an injury to private property,
and as direct an invasion of private right, incident to a lot, as
if the erections upon the lot were taken for public use. It
comes not within the letter, but is manifestly within the spirit 3
ordinances ... constitute an unreasonable interference with the use of private
property."
0 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOfAIN §5.1 (1950).
10 Smith v. Erie Rd. Co., 134- Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E. 2d 310 (1938).
11 Id. at 142. This language was quoted with approval in State ex rel.
McKay v. Kauer, 156 Ohio St. 347, 353, 102 N.E. 2d 703 (1951).
12 7 Ohio St. 460 (1857).
13 Perhaps such a taking was not, in this Court's view, within the letter of
the constitution because of the then prevalent concept of public use which required
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of the provision of the constitution which requires compensation
for property taken for public use. 4 (Emphasis supplied).
This is as clear a holding as can be found of the proposition that
the right of use is as fundamental as the corporeal property itself, within
the purview of the Ohio Constitution. This language of the Crawford
case has been consistently followed.'5
Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Evendale"6 indicates that this
principle is broad enough to protect advertising companies which had
acquired rights from landowners to erect billboards. In that case an
advertising company challenged a village ordinance prohibiting bill-
boards. The court declared the ordinance invalid stating:
• ..The question is practically the same under both constitu-
tions, [Ohio and United States] namely, are Ordinances No.
8-1952 and the Zoning Ordinance of 1953 invalid in that
they violate constitutional protection "of right of property in
the plaintiff", by attempted regulations, under the police powers,
which totally prohibit the carrying on of the legitimate business
of the plaintiff . . 17
In a recent Ohio Court of Appeals case a billboard company was
allowed to challenge a zoning ordinance regulating billboards.'
8
Thus it would appear that the right to erect billboards in Ohio is
a property right not only in the owner of the land on which they are
erected but also in one who has acquired the right from the owner, as well.
STATE REGULATION - POLICE POWER
As already pointed out, the General Assembly early assumed the
attitude that billboard regulation was primarily a local matter. How-
ever, state statutes were passed prohibiting the erection of 'billboards in
such positions that they obstruct the view of motorists at highway inter-
sections 9 and prohibiting billboards which contained images of stop signs
and railroad crossing signs.2' The relation of these statutes to public
safety is so apparent as to obviate any question as to their validity as an
exercise of the police power.
No widespread program of regulation along the highways has ever
been adopted by Ohio. The bill introduced in the 1955-56 session of
the General Assembly, if passed, would have inaugurated such a pro-
occupation and enjoyment. See Pontiac Improvement v. Board of Park Com-
missioners and discussion, infra p.
14 Note 12 supra, at 471.
15 Reeve v. Treasurer of Wood County, 80 Ohio St. 333 (1858); Mansfield
v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1901); State ex. rel. McKay v. Kauer,
note 11 supra.
16 54 Ohio Op. 354 (1954).
17Id. at 356.
38 Criterion Service Inc. v. East Cleveland, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 90, 88 N.E. 2d
300 (1949).
19 Oro REV. CODE §5547.04-.
20 OHio REV. CODE §5589.32.
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gram on turnpikes throughout the state. It would have prohibited the
erection of billboards, with certain minor exceptions relating to advertis-
ing on the premises, within 500 feet of any turnpike project.2 Other
states have statutes regulating billboards within varying distances from
highways. 
22
Would a law such as the proposed Ohio law, prohibiting billboards
along highways be held to be a valid exercise of the police power in
Ohio?
The first cases challenging billboard regulation involved ordinances.
In those cases the billboard portion of the ordinance was considered alone
and without consideration to its place as part of a broader regulation
of property uses.23 An Ohio court held to be unreasonable requirements
that no billboard be less than fifteen feet from the street line, that no
billboard be nearer the lot line than the building on the adjoining lot
and that no billboard be erected so as to face any public park, square, or
municipal, county or federal building unless a permit be obtained.
24
In the leading case of Euclid v. imbler Realty Co." the United
States Supreme Court paved the way to a more liberal approach. In this
case the Village of Euclid adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance
which set out in detail the uses which could be made of lands within each
of six zones. Among the use restrictions, was one excluding billboards
from all except zones U-5 and U-6. The ordinance as a whole was
challenged as being an unconstitutional interference with the use of prop-
erty. The United States Supreme Court sustained the ordinance in gen-
eral as a reasonable promotion of public health, safety and general welfare.
In a recent case an Ohio Court of Appeals stated that "Outdoor
advertising is a business that is subject to classification as all other com-
mercial enterprises," 26 and held that a zoning ordinance was reasonable
which prohibited billboards, except for accessory use, in retail store dis-
tricts but permitted them in commercial districts. So the question of reg-
ulation by zoning appears to be resolved in favor of allowing rigid
restrictions of billboards which would undoubtedly have been invalid
within the holdings of the earlier cases. As the Indiana Supreme Court
21 Note 2 supra.
22 For example, New York requires a permit before construction of billboards
within 500 feet of the New York Thruway System. 42 NEw YORK LAws OF 1952,
(Supp 1955) §361a. Maine and Mississippi prohibit signs nearer than 50 feet of
the highway ME. REV. STAT. c. 23 §142 (1954), Miss. CODE ANN. §8159 (1942).
Vermont provides that signs containing 300 square feet or more of surface shall
be at least 300 feet from the center of the used portion of the highway and signs
under 300 square feet shall be as many linear feet removed as there are square feet
on the face of the sign, but in no case nearer than 35 feet. VERMONT REv. STATUTES
§7689 (1947).
23 See cases cited in note 8 supra.
24 State ex rel. Morton v. Rapp, note 5 supra.
25 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
26 Criterion Service, Inc. v. East Cleveland, note 18 supra.
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has said: ". . Restrictions which years ago would have been deemed
intolerable and in violation of the property owners' constitutional rights
are now desirable and necessary, and zoning ordinances fair in their re-
quirements are usually sustained."27
The problem of regulating billboards along highways has been
approached in various ways by courts of other states. In Churchill and
Tat v. Rafferty,)" the validity of a Phillipine Island law, enacted while
the Philippines were an American possession, which empowered their Col-
lector of Internal Revenue to remove "any sign, signboard, or billboard
displayed or exposed to public view [if it be] offensive to the sight or
otherwise a nuisance", was challenged as a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. The Court said:
. . .Man's aesthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to
through his sense of sight ... Governments have spent millions
on parks and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the
first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then,
should the Government not interpose to protect from annoyance
this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him
from offensive noises and smells.2 9
This nuisance approach is rather ingenious in that it is consonant
with the concept of property rights and avoids the stigma of prohibiting
the use of property for mere aesthetic purposes.
Then the court set forth a second approach when it said:
...Suppose the owner of private property, who so vigorously
objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should
require the advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards
so that they would face the interior of the property instead of
the exterior. Billboard advertising would die a natural death if
this were done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted
use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public
highways is at once apparent ...Hence, we conceive that the
regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a
regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of
the streets and other public thoroughfares.3 0
A Vermont case is significant in its approach to the right of one
other than the landowner to erect billboards. In the case of Kelbro, Itc.
v. Myrick3 ' a billboard company challenged the Vermont statute prohibit-
ing signs nearer than 300 feet from a highway intersection. The court
held that the right to erect billboards was appurtenant to the land. Citing
Goddard on Easements, the court stated:
"[A] right of way appurtenant to a dominant tenement can be
27 General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309, 313
(1930).




31 Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 30 A. 2d 527. (Vt. 1943).
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used only for the purpose of passing to or from that tenement.
It cannot be used for any purpose unconnected with the enjoy-
ment of the dominant tenement, neither can it be assigned by
the owner to another person and so be made a right in gross,
nor can he license anyone to use the way when he is not coming
to or from the dominant tenement . . ."
No invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights appears.
3 2
It should be noted that a recent lower court case in Ohio apparently
assumed that a billboard company had such a property right in the busi-
ness of constructing billboards and was within the protection of the
Ohio Constitution.33 In that case the Court of Appeals gave no indica-
tion that the advertising company had no right to sue but held only that
the regulation was reasonable as applied to the company. Thus the case
appeared to be contra to the Keibro case, which held that the lessee of the
right to erect billboards did not have such a right as to entitle him to
constitutional protection.
These approaches allow far-reaching regulation of billboards. The
nuisance approach of the Philippine Island case has possible application
in Ohio. It is consonant with the Ohio view that the right to erect bill-
boards is a property right. But under that approach, the use of the right
is found to be unreasonable and therefore a nuisance.
In an action claming nuisance, and with no legislation prohibiting
such an establishment, an Ohio Court of Appeals held that a junk yard
was a nuisance. 4 However the court rejected the fact of the unsightliness
of the junk yard as the basis of its holding. Rather it held that it was
impossible as a matter of law to operate the junk yard without the emission
of noxious odors and gas and that therefore its operation constituted a nui-
sance. In .Tarford v. Dagenhart,3  a more recent case, the Court of
Appeals of Clark County held that an undertaking establishment would
be a nuisance even though no noxious odors or gases would be emitted.
It took the position that the constant reminder of death created by an
undertaking establishment had a depressing effect on people, thereby
rendering its maintenance a nuisance. The court thereby recognized that
a use of property could be a nuisance although such use did not affect
neighbors or their land by emitting any form of noxious odors, gases or
noises. Such expansions of the traditional nuisance concept suggests that
a court could adopt the view that the use of property to erect billboards
is a nuisance because such use affects the safety of persons driving upon a
highway. Such a finding would avoid the problem the courts have had
in relying upon purely aesthetic grounds.
Of course if a court found a sufficient relationship between billboards
and public safety, the employment of the nuisance concept would be
32 Id. at 530, 531.
33 Note IS supra.
34 Bohley v. Crofoot, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 667 (1929).
35 28 Ohio L. Abs. 308 (1936).
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unnecessary. But if the court were hesitant to find sufficient correlation
to uphold a statute based on public safety alone, the addition of the nui-
sance argument may be persuasive.
Whether the court could make such a finding depends upon whether
there is sufficient positive correlation between traffic accidents and the
presence of billboards to justify declaring their presence to be a public
nuisance. Certainly the controlling purpose for the erection of billboards
is to influence travelers upon the highways. Many cases have given
recognition to this fact.3 6
The New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court recognized that there is sufficient relation between safety and ad-
vertising on moving vehicles to sustain a municipal ordinance effecting
its prohibition." The Ohio Supreme Court in Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike
Commission 5 indicated that it thought there was some relation between
billboards and highway safety. At least one study indicates that the
number of accidents increases with the number of billboards.39 One
explanation for this is that billboards are present because of the large
amount of traffic, and this large amount of traffic, not the billboards, is
responsible for the increased accident rate. Yet, the fact that the purpose
of the blboard is to gain attention, cannot be discounted.
There are a number of provisions which could be inserted in any
police power regulation to limit its breadth and enhance its chances of
being upheld.
Thus, restrictions on 'billboards could be limited to only those high-
ways where an administrative agency has found their presence to be a
traffic hazard. Absolute prohibition could be imposed only for a reason-
able distance from the highway. To insure consistency, any such distance
limitation should be a specified distance from the outer edge of the tray-
36 Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, note 28 supra; Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick,
note 31 supra; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works,
289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935) AJp. dismissed, 297 U. S. 725. In the latter
case the court stated: "Another basis for the rules and regulations is that they
tend to protect people traveling upon highways from the intrusion of the public
announcements thrust before their eyes by signs and billboards . . . .This is not
a mere matter of banishing that which in appearance may be disagreeable to some.
It is protection against intrusion by foisting the words and emblems of signs and
billboards upon the mass of the public against their desire." (p. 814)
37 Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. City of New York, 194 N.Y. 19, 86 N.E. 824
(1909) aff'd 221 U. S. 467. Also, in Perlmutter v. Green, 259 N. Y. 327, 182 N.E.
5 (1932), the New York Court of Appeals in referring to the right of the super-
intendent of public highways to erect barriers to hide the view of a billboard said:
"Again, if the purpose is to shut out from view scenes which might distract the
attention of the driver of a car, the superintendent may aim to make the highway
safer for those who use it by erecting screens to keep the eye of the driver on the
road as he may erect barriers to keep the car on the road on dangerous curves.
(p. 6)
38 See discussion at note 22, supra.
39 Highway Improvement Research Board, Bulletin No. 55, 35, 36 (1952).
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eled portion of the highway. On divided highways, for example, a dis-
tance measured from the center of the right-of-way, may prohibit bill-
boards for an unreasonable distance at one point and allow them in close
proximity at another. Further it would seem desirable to make some
distinction between existing billboards and those to be erected in the fu-
ture. Unreasonable deprivation of property is more likely to be found as
to a physical structure which has already been erected. As to existing struc-
tures, the deprivation is of physical property in addition to the right to
use of the land. A number of cases indicate that a greater showing of
necessity is needed to sustain a requirement for removal of existing bill-
boards. An Ohio court has held that where a billboard was not in viola-
tion of a statute or ordinance when erected, its maintenance would not
be enjoined unless the public safety required it.4" The Indiana Supreme
Court sustained an ordinance, adopted pursuant to statutory authority, as
applied to future billboards, but declared it invalid as applied to existing
billboards. 4
1
A possible approach to this problem of existing structures is an ap-
plication of an amortization principle, i.e., allowing the existing billboard
to stand for the period of its estimated life but prohibiting alteration or
replacement. An analogous use of the principle has been tried in zoning
as to non-conforming uses. Such a provision cushions the deprivation
aspect of regulation.
42
STATE REGULATION - EMINENT DOMAIN
An alternative or at least a supplemental solution to the problem
of billboard regulation appears to be the use of the power of eminent
domain.
Lewis gives the following definition of the power: "Eminent domain
is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property
to particular uses, for the purpose of promoting the general welfare."4
Judge Cooley defines it as authority to "appropriate and control individ-
ual property for public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience,
or welfare may demand." 4  (Emphasis supplied.) This power is ex-
clusive with the sovereign but it may be delegated. However, any dele-
gation of the power will be strictly construed.4 5
In Ohio, the sovereign power of eminent domain is limited by the
constitution, which provides:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate but subservient
to the public welfare. When taken in time of war or other
40 Belton v. Thomas Cusack Co., 3 Ohio L. Abs. 276 (1925).
41 General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis, note 32 supra.
42 For a discussion of this principle see note, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 470 (1954).
43 1 LEWis, EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1900).
44 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 524- (1890).
45 Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Park Comm'rs., 104- Ohio St. 447,-
135 N.E. 635 (1922); McMechan v. Board of Education of Richland Twp., 157
Ohio St. 241, 105 N.E. 2d 270 (1952); 15 0. JuR., EMIINENT DOMAIN §12 (1931).
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public exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate seizure or
for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be
open to the public, without charge, a compensation shall be made
to the owner, in money, and in all other cases, where private
property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor
shall first be made in money . . . (Emphasis supplied.) 4"
Ohio courts have held that the right to erect billboards is property
entitled to be held inviolate within the protection of this constitutional
provision.4" The question is therefore whether the right is subject to the
power of eminent domain as circumscribed by that same provision, i.e.,
whether such an appropriation would be a taking for a public use.
This consideration raises, directly, the question of whether intangible
property rights may be "taken" by appropriation. There are two ap-
proaches to this problem. One might be called the strict; the other
the liberal.
The strict conception of a "taking" within the meaning of
the constitutional expression has been held to require a physical
invasion of the property affected by appropriation.
4 8
On the other hand,
The modern and prevailing view is that any substantial interfer-
ence with private property which destroys or lessens its value, or
by which the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in any
substantial degree abridged or destroyed, is, in fact and in law,
a "taking" in the constitutional sense, to the extent of the dam-
age suffered, even though the title and possession of the owner
remains undisturbed. 9
Where, then, does Ohio stand on this issue? This precise question
was involved in Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Com'rs5 In that
case one of the powers given a park board was the "power to acquire
lands . . ." by gift or appropriation and "either the fee or any lesser
interest may be acquired."'"
Acting under this grant of power, the Board appropriated a parcel
of land in fee and then as to the adjacent parcel, appropriated:
Ninth. The right to prevent the erection or maintenance
of any billboard, signboard, or other advertising device (other
than a signboard or advertising device offering for sale or lease
all or a part of the premises upon which it is erected) upon the
premises last described [i.e. not appropriated in fee], in such
manner or location as to be seen from any portion of said park
or parkway within the valley of Rocky river.
5 2
46 OHIO CONST. ART. 19 §1 (1851).
47 See note 8 supra.
48 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §6.2 (1954).
49 Id. at §6.3.
50 104 Ohio' St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
5 1 Id. at 453.
52 Id. at 450.
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This was the ninth of ten Provisions in the Park Board's petition
to appropriate. The court held the attempted appropriation invalid, stat-
ing: "It must be conceded that the use for which the property is taken
must be a public use, and the property must be taken.""3 The court said
further that, "The Constitution and the statute contemplate the physical
possession and use, and not the regulatory power which the state might
exercise under the police power."
' 4
In the third paragraph of the syllabus in that case the Supreme
Court stated:
The phrase, "where private property shall be taken for
public use," contained in section 19, article 1, of the Constitu-
tion of Ohio, implies possession, occupation and enjoyment of
the property by the public, or by public agencies, to be used for
public purposes.
This is the strict view set out in Nichols on Eminent Domain.
5 5
It is not clear from the opinion whether the requirements of pos-
session, occupation and enjoyment were essential to a taking or a limita-
tion on what would be considered a public use. However, since "taking"
here was held to be a prerequisite for "public use", the requirement was
engrafted on every appropriation. Obviously this restriction severely
limited the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and would, ap-
parently prohibit the appropriation of intangible interests in property
where the owner remained in possession.
This holding of the Pontiac case was not seriously questioned until
1953 when the Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich. 6
In that case, the city of Cincinnati authorized the acquisition of certain
lands which were termed "blighted" areas for the purpose of destroying
the existing structures and creating a housing project in cooperation with
the federal government. The plan entailed the condemnation of the
land and subsequent sale of the same land to private developers. The
city officials refused to carry out the project and the city solicitor instituted
a proceeding in mandamus to force action. It was contended, on the
basis of the holding of the Pontiac case, that "the Ohio Constitution
prohibits the exercise of the right of eminent domain where there will
ultimately be no use or right of use of the property taken on the part
of the public or some limited portion of the public . . ., The Supreme
Court denied this contention, however, saying that:
... the decision in that [Pontiac] case could rest either upon the
statement of law set forth in the first paragraph of the syllabus
or that in the second paragraph of the syllabus. So far as the
third paragraph of the syllabus supports the contention of the
53 Id. at 457.
54 Id. at 464.
55 See quote at note 48 supra.
56 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E. 2d 778 (1953).
57 Id. at 26.
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respondents, it appears to be contrary to the intention expressed
by the words used in Section 19 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion. s
The Court further held that the only limitation on the purpose for
which the power of eminent domain could be expressed was that it be
for the "public welfare". The court added that "in that section [Article
I, Section 19] of the Constitution, they [the people] regarded property
taken for 'the public welfare' as property 'taken for public use'. '
It is unfortunate that the court in this case did not state more clearly
what effect its decision had on the holding of the Pontiac case instead
of leaving to speculation the extent to which the Pontiac case is over-
ruled. It had early been held that there can be a "taking" without
physical dispossession such as where there is a change of grade.6"
Therefore the Pontiac requirements of occupation and possession would
appear to have been requirements of "public use". The opinion in the
Pontiac case implied that "public use" necessitated physical possession.
The court quoted Lewis on Eminent Domain that "'Public use' means
the same as use by the public, . . . .61 Thus, the Rich holding, that the
limitation is "public welfare" and not "public use" appears to overrule
the strict requirement of occupation and possession.
It should be noted, however, that the Rich case is open to an alter-
native interpretation. In that case there was some occupation and pos-
session by the public during the time the buildings were being removed
from the blighted area. Thus if Pontiac stands for the proposition that
a "taking" requires physical occupation and possession, it can be argued
that the Rich concept of "public welfare" does not affect those require-
ments.
Serious doubt is cast on this latter analysis by the later case of St.
Stephen's Club v. Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority2 where
the property appropriated by a housing authority was not within the slum
cleared area. When this case was in the Court of Appeals that court
held:
. . . conferring power of eminent domain upon metropolitan
housing authorities is a valid constitutional enactment in the
interest of public welfare.
To the objection that the property was not a slum area the court
said:
We think the argument advanced by the appellant that the au-
thority may not proceed in this case because the land is vacant
and not located within a slum area is untenable.
There is no such limitation in the housing act.6 3
8 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 See Crawford v. Delaware, note 12 supra.
61 Note 45 supra at 459.
62 160 Ohio St. 194, 115 N.E. 2d 385 (1952).
03 95 Ohio App. 113, 115 N.E. 2d 82, 88 (1952).
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The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed. In
referring to the requirements for public use, the court stated that "Sub-
serviency to public welfare is a broader restriction upon private rights
in property than subserviency to actual use by the public."6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus it appears that the Rich case rejected the concept of "public
use" in favor of "public welfare" and the St. Stephen's Club case has
re-emphasized that there is now no requirement for actual possession
by the public.
The exact problem of power to appropriate the intangible right to
erect billboards arose again in the recent case of Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike
Commission. 5 In this case the statute provided:
The Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to: . ..
(I) Acquire, . . ., by purchase or otherwise, . . ., such public
or private lands, . . ., or parts thereof or rights therein, rights
of way, property, rights, easements and interests as it deems
necessary for carrying out Sections 5537.01 to 5537.23, ....66
Pursuant to this authority, the Turnpike Commission adopted a
resolution appropriating, in addition to the turnpike right of way the
following:
Second, all rights to erect on any of the aforesaid remaining
lands any billboard, sign, notice, poster, or other advertising
device which would be visible from the travelway of Ohio
Turnpike project No. 1, and which is not now upon said lands. 67
The supreme court invalidated this appropriation saying:
. . .we do not believe it [the statutory authority given the
Turnpike Commission] can reasonably be said to comprehend
the appropriation of lands and uses thereof such as are here
involved which are not necessary in the construction and opera-
tion of a turnpike proper.
If specific authority should be forthcoming, we suppose
further problems and further litigations might occur, but they
are merely anticipatory and of no present concern. 68 (Em-
phasis Supplied.)
The court seems to be saying that the right to erect billboards is "property"
and indicates it is possible for the legislature to grant authority to appro-
priate the right if the grant of authority is specific. It is significant here
to note also that Judge Lamneck in his concurring opinion thought both
that the right to erect billboards is subject to appropriation and that the
Puthority was
.* sufficiently comprehensive to permit the Turnpike Com-
mission to adopt a resolution, or resolutions, for appropriation
64 Note 62 supra at 199.
65 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E. 2d 719 (1954).
66 OHIO REV. CODE §5537.04 (I)
67 Note 65 supra at 92.
68 Id. at 934.
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which will eliminate billboards and other advertising media in
close proximity to a turnpike which tend to affect safety of
travel on a turnpike.
9
It would therefore seem now that the holding of the syllabus of
the Pontiac case has been finally laid to rest and that the court has
opened the door to the use of eminent domain to appropriate the right
to erect billboards.
Both the Pontiac case and the Ellis case, however, reveal a further
problem in that of describing the interest taken with sufficient definiteness
to apprise the owner of the extent of the taking. The vagueness in the
appropriation resolution in the Ellis case arose from the use in the resolu-
tion of the word "visible" to describe the distance in which billboards were
prohibited.7" The court said:
...We are of the opinion that the adopted resolution quoted
above is too indefinite and uncertain to be valid and enforce-
able. The word "visible" standing alone is vague and ambigu-
ous.
71
The court indicated its concern with distance when, referring to the
interpretation of the word visible, it asked "What approximate distance
in feet or yards is involved?" Judge Lamneck accentuated this concern
in his concurring opinion when he said:
* . . In the absence of specific legislative authority defining
authority of the Turnpike Commission relative thereto, the
necessity of such appropriation must be clearly shown, and the
appropriation resolution therefor must be confined to reasonable
and definite territorial limits .... 71
Thus, it would appear that the replacement of the word "visible" in the
appropriation resolution with a reasonable, definite distance would satisfy
the requirements of definiteness.
CONCLUSION
That the problem of regulation of billboards is a complex one, can-
not be denied nor minimized. However, the history of their regulation
by municipalities indicates that the problem is capable of solution. There
are several alternative and supplemental solutions to the problem from a
legal standpoint. Which solution is feasible from an economic or political
standpoint is a legislative policy matter not here considered.
Control of billboards along state highways appears possible by the
use of either the police power or eminent domain or a combination of
them.
If regulation by police power is to be sustained, it must bear a
reasonable relation to public welfare. Basically, the problem is whether
there is sufficient evidence to show that the presence of billboards con-
69 Id. at 95.
70 See resolution cited at note 67 supra.
71 Note 65 supra at 93.
72 Note 65 supra at 95.
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tributes to traffic hazards. If this type of regulation is to be used it should
be preceded by thorough study by the legislature. Data should be gath-
ered to support the legislative action. If the legislature conducts such a
study and enacts a statute in light of what it finds to be the present day
needs of the public, there is good reason to suppose its action will be
sustained.73
It appears that the barriers created in the Pontiac case, preventing
the use of eminent domain to appropriate intangible rights, have now
been effectively overruled or explained away. One writer thinks the
use of eminent domain to prevent billboards is impractical because of
difficulty in assessing the value of the property interest taken. 74 How-
ever, the court in the Ellis case made no mention of worry over such
difficulty. It is arguable that if the public needs private property it should
be willing to pay for it and that eminent domain should be used if pos-
sible. In any event, eminent domain should be given serious consideration
for use with respect to existing structures.
Bernard V. Fultz
73 An example of how "conscientious effort and thoroughness" on the part of
a legislature can affect judicial attitude is illustrated in Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 502 (1934). That case involved statutory fixing of the price of milk. The
legislature made extensive studies of the problems in the milk industry. The
United States Supreme Court said:
... appropriate statutes passed in an honest effort to correct the threatened
consequences may not be set aside because the regulation adopted fixed
prices reasonably deemed by the legislature to be fair . ..
74 Henry NV. Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, note 6 supra.
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THE FELONY MURDER RULE IN OHIO
Although today the criminal law is composed almost entirely of
statutory law, an understanding of the old common law concepts is neces-
sary for a complete mastery of the subject since invariably the courts
turn to these concepts in construing the more modern statutes. It is, per-
haps, an anomaly that our complex societal contacts are based to a large
extent on the same general rules of conduct that were used to deal with
such medieval situations as those picturesquely referred to as "sudden
affrays". For this reason a reappraisal of our thinking on the subject
and a determination of whether there is an exigency for these old rules
in our contemporary civilization would seem appropriate. This paper
takes one of those rules and analyzes it and its development in Ohio with
an eye toward determining whether or not it still has a place in our
body of law.
FELONY MURDER AT COMMON LAW
At common law murder was defined as homicide with malice afore-
thought. Malice aforethought consisted of any of the following states
of mind:
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, any person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not.
(b) Knowledge that the act or omission which causes death
will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, some person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied
by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is
caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in ar-
resting or keeping in custody a person whom he has a right
to arrest or keep in custody, or in keeping the peace.'
The felony murder rule as originally stated by Coke classed any
death resulting from an unlawful act as murder. During the years of
its development this rule was considerably limited.2 Foster's definition
thereafter narrowed Coke's extremely harsh rule to include only unlawful
acts that were felonies.3 In 1883 Judge Fitzjames Stephen wrote his
landmark opinion in Regina v. Serne.4 In this case the defendant had
been indicted for the murder of a boy who had died as the result of a
fire set by the defendant. Judge Stephen instructed the jury:
I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to
commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder;
it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be danger-
ous to life, and likely in itself to cause death, done for the pur-
l 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 21 (1883).
2 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 56 (6th ed. 1680).
3 TURNER, KENNEY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 126 (1952).
4 16 Cox C.C. 311, 313 (1887).
COMMENTS
pose of committing a felony which caused death should be
murder . . . In the present case . . . it is alleged that he [the
prisoner] arranged matters in such a way that any person of
the most common intelligence must have known perfectly well
that he was putting all those people in deady risk.
It has been suggested that the present law of England is based on
this statement of the rule by Stephen.5 However, the later English de-
cisions do not seem to follow Stephen strictly and it seems enough to sus-
tain a conviction of murder that a person kill another by an act of violence
in the course of or in the furtherance of a felony involving violence.
0
The general American view of the rule appears to be that a conviction
for first degree murder follows where the killing occurred while the
accused was engaged in the commission of certain felonies, usually
enumerated by statute, notwithstanding the fact that there was no design
to effect death.'
STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE IN OHIO
Most American jurisdictions specify certain felonies; usually arson,
rape, robbery and burglary which make a killing occurring during their
commission murder in the highest degree.' Five states, like New York,
make a killing during the commission of any felony murder in the high-
est degree.' The present Ohio Statute, which is OHIO REv. CODE SEC-
TION 2901.01 (12400) (12399) reads as follows:
No person shall purposely, and either of deliberate and premedi-
tated malice, or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or at-
tempting to perpetrate rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, kill
another.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder in the first
degree and shall be punished by death unless the jury trying
the case recommends mercy, in which case the punishment shall
be imprisonment for life.
Murder in the first degree is a capital crime under Sections 9
and 10 of Article I, Ohio Constitution.
The first legislation on the subject of murder in Ohio was under
the territorial organization of 1788 in which the common law definition
5 HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND §749 (2d ed. 1933).
6 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, A.C. 479 (1920). This would
appear to place the English view of the felony murder rule midway between the
definitions of Foster and Stephen. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice .4fore-
thought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 559 (1934).
7' 1 WARREN, HoMIclE §74 (1914). See State v. Glover, 330 Mio. 709,
50 SAV. 2d 1049 (1932) which contains an excellent discussion of the American
view. See also 87 A.L.R. 414 for a discussion of the causal relation between the
underlying felony and the killing.
8 1 id. §§4-53.
9 Full treatment is given to the statutory provisions of all the states in an
excellent study of the New York felony murder rule. See Arent & MacDonald,
The Felony Murder Doctrine and its .pplication Under the New York Statutes,
20 CORNELL L.Q. 288 (1934).
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of criminal homicide was strictly followed with no division of the crime
into degrees." In 1804 this Statute was renacted by the first session of
the Ohio General Assembly in the following language:
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that if any person of sound
memory and discretion, shall unlawfully kill any human being
and in the public peace, with malice aforethought, either express
or implied, and being thereof legally convicted shall suffer
death. 1
In 1815 the common law definition of murder was repealed and
the crime was specifically into two degrees. 2 The statute defining first
degree murder was worded:
That if any person shall purposely, of deliberate and premedi-
tated malice, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any
rape, arson, robbery or burglary, kill another, every such per-
son, or his or her aiders, abettors, counsellors and procurers shall
be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree, and upon con-
viction thereof suffer death."3
This statute was reenacted in 1821"4 with the addition of commas after
the words "perpetration", and "perpetrate" and the substitution of a
semi-colon for the comma after "another". In 1824 the twenty-second
general assembly reenacted the statute leaving out the commas after
Cperpetration" and "perpetrate" 1 5 and this was subsequently reenacted
again by the twenty-ninth general assembly in 1831.16 In 1835 this
statute was repealed and the following statute substituted:
That if any person shall purposely and of deliberate and pre-
meditated malice, or in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
any rape, arson, robbery or burglary, or by administering poison
or causing the same to be done, kill another,-every such person
shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree, and upon
conviction thereof shall suffer death."
This was the statute in force at the time the landmark case of Robbins
v. The State"5 was decided. The court held that even where the killing
was "by administering poison" under the statute then in force, an intent
or purpose to kill was an essential element of the crime of first degree
murder. Apparently Chief Justice Bartley, who wrote the opinion in the
Robbins case had before him "Curwen's Laws of Ohio in Force 1854".
In that reproduction of Ohio laws the first degree murder statute re-
ceived a minor, but highly significant change. After the word "purposely"
10 Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131, 135 (1857) ; see also 1 Laws of N.V.
Terr. 18 (1791).
11 3 Ohio Laws 2.
12 13 Ohio Laws 86.
13 2 Chases' State 856.
14 19-21 Ohio Laws 186.
15 22 Ohio Laws 158.
16 29 Ohio Laws 136.
17 33 Ohio Laws 33.
18 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857).
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a comma had been added. If there had been no comma there, it seems
possible that the majority might have held the word "purposely" to modify
merely the first clause. 9 However, with the addition of the comma it
was held that "purposely" modified all three clauses, thereby adding the
lequirement of specific intent to the felony murder clause. It must be
admitted that Bartley's decision was not based entirely on principles of
grammatical construction. It is conceivable that even had he had a cor-
rect version of the statute before him that he would have held the same
way since he based his decision in part on the fact that the "reason
and spirit of the statute" contemplated proof of an actual intent to kill.2"
Subsequently, the legislature not only adopted the doubtful interpretation
of the Robbins case, but added the words "and either." 21 In 1898 the
language was not altered, but a provision for mercy on the recommenda-
tion of the jury was added. 22 There has been no substantial change in
the language of the statute since that time. Since the Robbins case the
court has adhered to that construction of the statute and its subsequent
legislative adoption in continuing to construe "purposely" as modifying
all three clauses.
In State v. Turk23 the defendant procured others to set fire to his
store with an eye to collecting on the insurance. The fire resulted in the
death of several persons. The defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed pointing out that the
statute requires a specific intent to kill; in this case no such intent had
been shown. 24 The defendant had committed arson which was an un-
lawful act, but an unintended death that occurs during the commission
of an unlawful act is manslaughter and not first degree murder.2 5 In
many other cases the Robbins decision has been consistently followed and
it can be equivocally stated that Ohio requires a specific intent to kill
in felony murder cases.
26
10 8 Ohio St. at 175-76. For a complete analysis of the Robbins case see the
opinion of Justice Taft in State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio St. 214, 218, 102 N.E. 2d 11
(1951).
20 S Ohio St. at 173-75, Judge Taft, however, feels there is little doubt on
this question. See his opinion in the Farmer case at 220.
21 11 REVISED STATUTES OF OHIO C. 3 §6808.
22 93 Ohio Laws 223.
23 48 Ohio App. 489 (1934), aff'd, 129 Ohio St. 245.
24 The Turk case has been criticized as being an unnecessarily narrow con-
struction of the statute. See note 26 J. CIM. L. 126 (1935-36). The major point
of criticism seemed to be based on the fact that in Illinois a conviction of murder
has been sustained under a similar fact situation in People v. Goldvarz, 346 I1.
393, 178 N.E. 892 (1931). The Illinois statute, however, differs considerably from
the Ohio statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38 §358 (1935).
25 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES §262 (5th ed. 1952).
26 Kain v. State, 8 Ohio St. 306 (1858) ; Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 126
(1876) ; Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150 (1884) ; State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio C.C. 94,
3 Ohio C. Dec. 48 (1891) ; Blair v. State, 5 Ohio C.C. 501, 3 Ohio C. Dec. 242
(1891) ; Jones v. State, 14 Ohio C.C. 35, 7 Ohio C. Dec. 305 (1897) ; State v. Jones
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Any apparent deviations which might be cited as approving any
other rule can be explained on the basis of a confusion between the re-
quirement of actual intent on the one hand and problems of evidence
encountered in the proof of that intent on the other hand. The requisite
intent must always be shown, but it may, of course, be inferred from the
facts and circumstances." An illustration of this confusion is found in
the case of State v. Salter."8 In that case the defendant had chloroformed
a girl and raped her. When she subsequently died he was indicted for
first degree murder. His conviction was sustained on the grounds that
the trial judges, sitting without a jury, had found all the essential ele-
ments of the crime including the intent to kill. 9 The Court, however,
went further and in the latter part of its opinion intimated that if the
defendant has the intent to commit the underlying felony he then has
the intent to kill. Thus the Salter rule seems to be:
From such circumstances and from the intent to do the act that
resulted in death, the intent to kill, which is contemplated in
Section 12400, General Code, may be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This rule seems clearly wrong in light of the Robbins case, and the
Salter court's attempt to distinguish away Robbins on the basis that in
that case, instructions to the jury were involved while in Salter they were
not, seems inadequate.
Whatever doubt the Salter case cast in this field has been removed
by a recent expression of the law of felony murder by the Ohio Supreme
Court in State v. Farmer."° Here the defendant had killed a man while
perpetrating a robbery. His conviction for first degree murder was re-
versed because the record failed to disclose sufficient evidence from which
the jury could have inferred a specific intent to kill. The Court re-
affirmed the view that intent to kill is necessary to sustain a conviction
5 N.P. 390, 8 Ohio Dec. 645 (1898) ; State v. Del Bello, 8 Ohio Dec. 455 (1898) ;
State v. Atkinson, 6 N.P. 232, 8 Ohio Dec. 405 (1899) ; State v. Lukens, 6 N.P. 363,
9 Ohio Dec. 349 (1899) ; State v. Strong, 12 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 698 (1902) ; State
v. Schiller, 70 Ohio St. 1, 70 N.E. 505 (1904) ; State v. Knapp 70 Ohio St. 380,
71 N.E. 705 (1904); State v. Oppenheimer, 49 Ohio L. Bull. 257 (1904-); Bailus
v. State, 16 Ohio C.C. 226 (1904); State v. Mueller, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 542 (1908);
State v. Pierce, 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 413 (1921) ; Hoppe v. State, 29 Ohio App.
467, 163 N.E. 715 (1928) ; State v. Turk, note 21, supra; Malone v. State, 130 Ohio
St. 44-3, 200 N.E. 473 (1936) ; State v. Colley, 46 Ohio L. Abs. (1946); State v.
Farmer, note 18 supra.
27 State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E. 2d 313 (1936); Munday v.
State, 50 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 656, 16 Ohio Cir. Dec. 712 (1904), aff'd 72 Ohio St. 614-
(1905) ; State v. Mueller, 6 Ohio L. Rep. 542 (1908). The state is aided by a
presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.
State v. Del Bello, 8 Ohio Dec. 455 (1898) ; Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38
N.E. 79 (1884); Ridenour v. State, 38 Ohio St. 772 (1882). This presumption is
naturally not conclusive. See note 21 U. OF CiN. L.R. 201 (1952).
28 149 Ohio St. 264 (1948).
29 See note 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 352 (1948).
30 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 N.E. 2d 11 (1951).
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under the felony murder rule in Ohio. If Salter says that the defendant
need not have a specific intent to kill then it is certainly overruled by
the Farmer case. In any event there appears to be little doubt that the
latter case represents the law of Ohio.
3 1
An interesting aspect of the Farmer case is the court's expression
of the so-called deadly weapon doctrine. The court indicated that the
use of a weapon likely to produce death or serious bodily harm and
which actually does result in death will, in the absence of explanation,
be sufficient evidence from which an intent to kill may be inferred. On
the other hand if the instrument used is not likely to produce such a result
then the finding is not justified in the absence of other evidence. In this,
the court is aided by the presumption that one intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts. Therefore it is possible that had the
weapon been found in the Farmer case the result might have been differ-
ent. Likewise if the wounds had been fresh then the undertaker might
have been able to offer opinion evidence that the decedent had been
struck by a deadly weapon.
The construction placed on the Ohio first degree murder statute
by the court in the Robbins case and subsequent decisions was not neces-
sarily inevitable. An Oregon court faced with the problem of constru-
ing a statute similar to the Ohio statute refused to adopt the view of the
Ohio court in the Robbins case. 2 Nebraska's Criminal Code of 1873
was adopted largely from the Ohio code and eventually, as might be ex-
pected, the same problem of construction arose there. The Nebraska
court evidently thought little of the Robbins decision and found enough
difference between the two statutes to justify their not adopting the strict
Ohio construction.33 The District of Columbia in construing a similar
statute took the Ohio view and cited both the Robbins and the Turk
cases.3 4 It should be noted, however, that four years later Congress en-
larged the scope of the first degree murder statute in the District of
Columbia by adding the words, "or without purpose to do so" before
the enumerated felonies.3"
DURATION OF THE FELONY
In addition to specifically enumerating the felonies a number of
other techniques have been employed to limit the application of the tra-
ditional felony murder rule. The reason for these limitations is the same
reason for the division of murder into degrees ziz. to limit the number
of capital punishments. 6
31 Hart & Hart, Review of Ohio Case Law for 1951, 47 Ohio Op. 287, 306
(1952).
32 State v. Brown, 7 Ore. 187, 198 (1879).
3 3 Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902).
3 4 Jordon v. United States, 87 F. 2d 64 (1936).
35 1 D.C. CoDE §22-2401.
36 CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 25, §249; BECCARIA, CRIMES AND
PUNISHIMENTS 97 et. seq. (1372) ; Michael & Wechsler, J Rationale of Homicide,
37 COLUM. L.R. 701 (1937).
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As has been pointed out earlier New York does not limit the felony
murder rule through a specific enumeration of the felonies to which it
can be applied; a" however, the New York courts do employ another
limitation by requiring the felony to be independent of the homicide. a8
By this they mean that if one assaults another with the intent to kill,
injure or resist arrest and does in fact kill the one assaulted then the
assault while it is felonious is "dependent" and hence will not support
a conviction under the felony murder rule. As Michael and Wechsler
point out,3 9 there has been no analysis of this test of "independence",
however to hold otherwise would erase any distinction between first and
second degree murder because every killing arising out of a felonious
assault would automatically be first degree murder under the felony
murder rule. The paradox of this limitation is that if one feloneously
assaults another and in the process kills a third person then the felony
murder rule applies, but if the assaulted person dies it does not apply
as to his death.4"
For a killing to have been done during the perpetration or commis-
sion of a felony and thus fall within the statutory language of most
jurisdictions, it is necessary that there be a spatial and temporal connec-
tion between the underlying felony and the killing. The killing must
have occurred during the duration of the felony, i. e., at a point some-
time before the actual termination of the felony. This gives rise to
another means of limiting the scope of the felony murder rule, i. e., by
narrowing the limits of the underlying felony it is possible to exclude
a killing from the felony and thus avoid application of the rule. Thus
where A and B committed a robbery at 2 A.M. and after stopping to
eat were apprehended by police 60 miles and 2 hours away from the
robbery and as a result of this apprehension a killing resulted, then serious
doubt arises as to whether this killing could be considered within the
limits of the original robbery.4' It seems well settled that the felony
begins when the criminal attempt is committed.42 However, when the
felony is held to have terminated varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The New York Court has apparently set rather narrow limits to the
time period during which a felony may be considered to be in progress
for the purposes of the felony murder rule. Thus the killing must occur
while the actor is engaged in doing something immediately connected
with the underlying crime, such as securing the plunder.4" In Ohio,
37 See note 8 supra.
38 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW & ITs ADMINISTRATION 218 (1940).
39 Ibid.
40 People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927).
41 In State v. Metalski, 116 N.J.L. 54-3, 185 At. 351 (1936), the majority felt
that such a killing did occur within the limits of the robbery, but a well reasoned
dissent felt otherwise.
42 People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989 (1903).
43 Arent & MacDonald, supra note 9, at 305.
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however, a broader rule is followed. The Ohio courts say that if there
is a killing within the res gestae of the initial crime then the killing is
murder for the purpose of the rule.". This is obviously a nebulous
criterion and it would be difficult to predict how a court would hold on
any given set of facts. Logically one might think that the question might
arise as to whether an Ohio court would react differently depending on
whether the underlying crime was robbery or burglary. It might be
argued that there should be a distinction since the crime of burglary
is complete upon the breaking and entry and the crime of robbery con-
tinues with the asportation of the stolen goods.45 Some courts have had
difficulty with this distinction,46 but in view of the broad scope of the
res gestae rule it seems unlikely that Ohio courts would make any dis-
tinction. This is borne out by the fact that the Habig case, a robbery
case, adopted and accepted the reasoning of the Conrad case which
involved a burglary.4 7
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOMPLICE UNDER THE
FELONY MURDER RULE
As early as 1536 it was held that if a person was killed accidently
by one of the members of a band all could be held guilty of murder.
48
Today the ordinary rules that govern the liability of accomplices 49 extend
to felony murder situations.5" This is also true in Ohio although one
might suspect that the requirement of specific intent to kill on the part
of the killer would prevent a conviction of an accomplice if he, in fact,
lacked the requisite intent. However, it seems well settled in Ohio that
if the killer himself can be held then his accomplices can also be con-
victed.5 This is true even though the homicide was not contemplated
by the parties in their original design.52 In Ohio, however, the require-
ment of specific intent would seem to eliminate a possibility of conviction
where the death for which the conspirator is sought to be held is the
result of the action of a non-participant in the underlying felony rather
than the result of an act of his co-conspirator. This is the situation that
would arise when A and B while robbing a store are challenged by C
and as a result of the ensuing gunbattle D, a bystander, is killed. Some
44 Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 78 N.E. 957 (1906); State v. Habig,
106 Ohio St. 151, 140 N.E. 195 (1922).
45 CLARK & MARSHALL, Op. cit. supra note 25 §§371, 401.
46 State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926, 98 S.W. 2d 632 (1936).
4 7 See 108 A.L.R. 848 (1937).
48 Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer's 128b (1536).
49 CLARK & MARSHALL, Op. cit. supra note 25 §§157-92.
50 I WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 7, §74. Also see 68 L.R.A. 193 (1922) for a
long collection of cases on this point.
51 Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 78 N.E. 957 (1906) ; Stephens v. State,
42 Ohio St. 150 (1884) ; Huling v. State, 17 Ohio St. 583 (1867) ; State v. Rogers,
64 Ohio App. 39, 27 N.E. 2d 791 (1938).
52 Stephens v. State, supra note 51, intent to rob. See also Zeller v. State,
9 Ohio L. Abs. 490 (1930) ; Wilson v. State, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 478 (1928).
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courts would hold A and B guilty of first degree murder even if C's
bullets had killed D and regardless of whether A or B had an intent to
commit the killing. 53
EVALUATION OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE IN OHIO
The major objections to the felony murder rule as it is usually
defined are that; the rule is too harsh because it includes accidental killings
within its scope since it pays no heed to intent,"' that it is objectionable
because it holds an accomplice responsible for an unintended felony com-
mitted by another,55 and that the broad extension of the res gestae
includes acts that might otherwise be beyond the normal scope of the
felony. Ohio's requirement of intent would seem to obviate the first
objection. As to the second objection while it is true that accomplices
will be held responsible for the acts of their coherts, this is not a result
of the felony murder rule, but rather, the general rules applicable to
parties engaged in criminal activity. Likewise the res gestae doctrine does
prescribe indefinite limits, but it has been aptly pointed out that the most
dangerous point in time during the commission of a felony comes at that
moment when the felon is threatened with capture or arrest during his
escape." Without the broad res gestae doctrine such time might fall
outside the limits of the felony murder rule and eliminate an area where
it seems most applicable. Therefore it would appear that the Ohio rule
either lacks or meets the usual objections to the rule. Yet it seems so
ideal that it is really not the felony murder rule at all, since in Ohio
the only result of the rule is to raise what might otherwise be second
degree murder to first degree murder if the killing happened to have
occurred during the commission of one of the enumerated felonies.
If one assumes that the usual rule is too harsh and then concludes
that the Ohio rule is no rule at all, then what remains to be done?
Should Ohio retain its present rule, adopt a more general rule such as
the one followed by the New York courts or perhaps come up with a
different solution altogether? Can anything good be said about the
felony murder rule? Holmes thought so, he felt that the general test
of murder was the degree of danger surrounding a certain pattern of
behavior. If certain acts were to be regarded as being dangerous under
certain circumstances then the legislature might make these acts punish-
able in a certain manner even though the danger was not generally
known. Therefore if it is shown that deaths occur disproportionately in
connection with other felonies then as Holmes put it:
53 Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947); Common-
wealth v. Almedia, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595 (1949) and see generally 12 A.L.R.
2nd 210 (1950).
54 Michael & Wechsler, supra note 36 at 1305.
1;5 Eisenberg, The Doctrine of Felony Murder in New York, N.Y.L.J., Jan 17,
1935 at 296, quoted in Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, FORDHAM L. REv. 43
(1937).
56 Corcoran, supra note 55 at 73.
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The law may, therefore, throw on the actor the peril, not
only of the consequences foreseen by him, but also of conse-
quences which, although not predicted by common experience,
the legislator apprehends.5 7
Holmes, however, seems to be an advocate of the same general philosophy
that Coke had expressed and which we have rejected as being too harsh
since it neither required intent nor foreseeability.
Yet even if we reject Holmes there does seem justification for the
application of the felony murder doctrine as a rule of treatment if it can
be shown that experience indicates that there is danger attendant that
death may result from the commission of a felony. However, is the tra-
ditional felony murder rule the only answer? Professor Moreland feels
that the felony murder rule was abolished by the decision in Regina v.
Serne.5 8 He would advocate removing the felony factor from the test
completely by using as the test, was the act, in itself, extremely dangerous
to human life and safety. As Moreland indicated this would place such
cases directly into the class he terms as negligent murders. 9 Without
going quite as far as Moreland, an answer might be found for Ohio by
substituting for the requirement of specific intent, conduct which amounts
to criminal negligence. Thus one would be liable under the felony
murder doctrine if during the commission of a felony a death occurs
as a result of an act, not intended to. cause death, but which amounts
to criminal negligence. Should this be the answer the question then be-
comes, how can the courts decide when a certain type of behavior falls
within the area of criminal negligence.
In doing so the courts might well consider four factors:
1. Risk. What degree of risk was created by the act of the
offender? Was it high, such as committing arson in a
crowded tenement or low, such as a robbery in the middle
of the desert?
2. State of Mind. Was the offender aware that he had created
a homicidal risk, in short, was he acting inadvertently or
advertently?
3. Motive. Was the offender's motive good, was he acting in
the public interest?
4. Justification. Does society justify taking risks of this sort?
Applying this test to a case arising under a felony murder situation would
seem to give a proper result and might well be the best answer to the
problem. For example if during the commission of a felony a man creates
a high degree of risk while acting advertently he would be convicted,
whereas the man who creates a low degree of risk while acting inad-
vertedly would not. The difficulty with the application of this theory
to the Ohio situation, however, is that Ohio apparently has no doctrine
57 HOLMIEs, THE COMMON LAW 57 (1881).
58 MORELAND, LAW OF HOMICIDE 44 (1952).
r9 MORELAND, op. cit. supra note 58, at 50.
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of criminal negligence."0 The solution then would seem to be a revision
of our first degree murder statute.
It is interesting to note that Ohio has a statute which makes a death
resulting from the obstruction of a railroad track murder in the first
degree61 and it has been held that the intent to kill is not a necessary
element in a case arising under that statute.6 2 Thus it would seem that
the Ohio legislature has no definite prohibition against the abolition of
a specific intent to kill in murder cases.
The Ohio felony murder rule as it exists today is undoubtedly hu-
mane, but serves very little use in our criminal law. Because of the
danger to large numbers of people that is possible in the felony murder
situation there is justification for some type of a rule increasing the penalty
in such cases. It is probably true that the ancient felony murder rule has
no place in our modern society. For this reason the State of Ohio could
well consider the adoption of the doctrine of criminal negligence, which
would cover not only the felony murder situation, but also through a
revision of the manslaughter statute adapt itself also to a number of other
situations in which it might serve to deter socially undesirable behavior.
Charles D. HIering, Jr.
60 State v. O'Mara, 105 Ohio St. 94, 136 N.E. 885 (1922) ; Jackson v. State,
101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870 (1920). The defendant's conduct has to have
violated a state law and as a result of this violation a death results.
61 Omo REV. CODE §2901.02.
62 Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N.E. 79 (1894).
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